[Battle of the two marshals. The greatest defeat of M. Tukhachevsky.] Revolution and war. Collection of the third ...

[Battle of the two marshals. The greatest defeat of M. Tukhachevsky.] Revolution and war. Collection of the third, 1920. Military-scientific journal.
Smolensk. Printing house of the publishing department of UVUZZAP, 1920. - 174 p., maps and diagrams in the text, 3 incl. with maps. Circulation of 5,000 copies. Publisher's cover, enlarged format (16.5 x 25 cm). The cover is worn and dirty, has tears, losses, including on the spine; significant traces of moisture, agitate the pages; traces of existence on the back of the cover; split block before the last sheet.

The issue, in addition to analyzing the actions of the Red Army under the command of Tukhachevsky near Warsaw on August 14-17, 1920, also included the work of the marshal himself "Revolution from outside".

[The march on Warsaw was both Tukhachevsky's" finest hour "and his" black day " in the Red Army, which, under the leadership of the young front commander, suffered its most crushing defeat in the Civil War. Later, in 1923, Tukhachevsky tried to justify himself in the book "The Campaign for the Vistula", written on the basis of a course of lectures at the Military Academy of the Red Army. He admitted his guilt — the war was lost by strategy, not politics, the military, not the leaders of the revolution. If the commander had tried to say otherwise, his career would have ended instantly. Tukhachevsky would not have become a marshal, but who knows, maybe the former lieutenant-Life guardsman would have passed the bitter cup of humiliation and death in 37.

He argued: "Politics has given the Red Army a difficult, risky and bold task. But how can this mean wrongness?! (In the sense that you must not doubt, dear Comrades Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, that I am trustworthy: I do not even think of criticizing you. - B. S.) There was not a single great deed that was not bold and decisive. And if we compare the October Revolution with our external socialist offensive, then, of course, the October task was much bolder, much more difficult. The Red Front had the opportunity to fulfill the task assigned to it, but it did not fulfill it."

How did the events that eventually led to the Red Army's march on Warsaw develop? The Soviet-Polish armed conflict began in January 1919 with the clash of Polish troops with Red Army units near Vilna. In the spring, the fighting spread to Belarus, and in the summer-to Ukraine. The Polish side sought to create an alliance with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine with its leading role in this new "federation" (although this term was used, the creation of a single state was not intended). At the same time, Poland claimed Vilna, Eastern Galicia, part of Volhynia and some border areas of Belarus. It was assumed that Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Romania would join the federation in the future. Soviet Russia, in turn, sought to establish communist governments in all these states, and in the future-to annex the territories of these countries.

The establishment of Soviet power in Poland was seen as a prologue to the revolution in Germany and the beginning of the"world proletarian revolution". When, after the collapse of Germany in the First World War, the Red Army entered Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, separate units were formed from the local Polish population, intended for the "liberation" of Poland, which caused the protest of the Polish government. Later, when during the Warsaw operation, Tukhachevsky's troops invaded the so-called Danzig Corridor, the Germans who lived there managed to form a German Rifle Brigade for the march on Berlin, which did not take place only because of the subsequent defeat of the armies of the Western Front.]