The Defeat of Hitlerism. Soviet Union, 1945 – First Edition

The Defeat of Hitlerism. Soviet Union, 1945 – First Edition

Poraz hitlerizma (The Defeat of Hitlerism), Published by the Propaganda Department of VŠ NOV i POJ (High Command of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia). Soviet Union, 1945 – First edition. A rare publication issued toward the end of World War II, marking the impending downfall of Adolf Hitler in light of the series of failures in his conduct of the war. Text in Bosnian.

“In today’s war, the strength of the German imperialist movement is great... yet the higher it rises, the more catastrophic its fall... The final military defeat of Hitler’s Germany is not far off. It must also culminate in the moral and political collapse of fascism…”.

A significant anti-Nazi publication, written by multiple authors during 1944 and issued shortly before the final defeat of Nazi Germany. The booklet offers a sharp critique of Adolf Hitler’s military and ideological failures, presenting a detailed analysis of the strategic, tactical, and structural mistakes that led to the collapse of the Third Reich. It argues that Hitler’s downfall was rooted in a fatal combination of ideological arrogance, personal interference in military planning, and a failure to understand the nature of modern warfare. The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 is described as a catastrophic blunder, launching a vast war of attrition without securing the Western Front or sufficient logistical advantage. This was followed by the declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, which expanded the conflict into a global confrontation against an enemy with overwhelming industrial superiority. The booklet denounces Hitler’s rigid refusal to allow tactical retreats, even when essential, leading to the destruction of entire German armies, particularly on the Eastern Front. It also emphasizes the Nazi prioritization of ideological goals, including mass extermination and persecution, over military and economic pragmatism, further weakening the German war effort and accelerating its demise. In contrast, the Soviet Union’s ability to absorb massive losses, relocate its industrial base eastward, and ramp up production far beyond German capacity is presented as a critical strategic advantage. The Red Army adapted rapidly, improving leadership, tactics, and coordination, achieving both quantitative and qualitative superiority, particularly in artillery, armor, and manpower. The authors argue that Hitler fatally underestimated Soviet resilience, believing it to be a weak and decaying state. Instead, the Nazis faced an empire with vast territorial depth, a massive population, and an extraordinary ability to absorb and recover from losses. Under these conditions, Hitler’s insistence on centralized control, total ideological war, and refusal to retreat turned the Eastern campaign into a war of annihilation that, from a strategic perspective, was nearly impossible for Germany to win. The booklet was intended for both partisan fighters and civilians in territories under Yugoslav partisan control, to bolster morale against the Nazi occupiers at a time when their defeat was already near. It was printed on simple paper under field conditions, in a limited wartime run, and has survived in only a small number of copies. A rare and important historical document reflecting the Yugoslav resistance and offering foundational perspectives on the anti-Nazi struggle in the Balkans, just before the fall of the Third Reich.

Rare. Only 5 copies recorded in the WorldCat global library catalog, all in Slovenian libraries.

116 pages. Good condition.