"The situation in the Gaza Strip is unique... The entry of a UN force into the Strip will lead to a deterioration ...

"The situation in the Gaza Strip is unique... The entry of a UN force into the Strip will lead to a deterioration in the security situation..." – Policy statement delivered by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion following the Sinai War. January 1957

"Most of the gangs of murderers and terrorists were sent from the Gaza Strip... In places where the UN should have intervened in the Middle East in accordance with UN laws, it did not do so, and where there is no need, it tries to interfere..." – INTERNATIONAL LAW OR ANARCHY IN THE MIDDLE EAST – Policy statement delivered by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion before the Knesset, on January 23, 1957. Printed and published by the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and printed at the Government Printing Office in Jerusalem. In English.

Full transcript of the statement by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion regarding UN involvement in Middle Eastern affairs following the Sinai War. In his speech, Ben-Gurion criticizes the United Nations for its failure to demand that the Arab states, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, uphold the Armistice Agreements they had signed in 1949, despite repeated violations: "Once again, Israel has discovered, to its sorrow and astonishment, that the UN institutions have consistently ignored these violations of the Armistice Agreements and of the UN Charter." He further states that when the Arab states organized an economic boycott against Israel, the UN again failed to fulfill its duty as stated in the first article of the UN Charter: "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural nature." Ben-Gurion also adds that the UN did nothing in response to the hostile acts committed against Israeli citizens since the establishment of the state.

Ben-Gurion continues, expressing his views on the governance of the Gaza Strip and rejecting UN intervention in the area—words that could almost have been written today: "The Gaza Strip, which was never Egyptian territory and was occupied by the Egyptian invaders in 1948 in violation of international law, served over the years as a springboard for aggression against Israel. Most of the gangs of murderers and terrorists were sent from the Strip... From the Gaza Strip, Fedayeen units were dispatched into Israel, and gangs of murderers and saboteurs were also organized in other Arab countries... The situation in the Gaza Strip is unique, and no UN force, by its very nature, will be able to prevent the organization of Fedayeen by the Egyptian authorities in this area and their deployment within Israeli territory. The entry of a UN force into the Strip will lead to a deterioration in the security situation of the Israeli settlements along the Strip, and in fact, throughout the limited territory of Israel... Israel has no intention of maintaining armed forces in the Gaza Strip, but for the sake of the residents of the area and their neighbors beyond it, Israel must remain in the Strip, while establishing an appropriate relationship between the Israeli administration and the United Nations. The administration will maintain internal security in the Strip through a police force, will continue to develop self-government among the population in towns and villages, and will continue to provide public services in the areas of health, education, electricity, irrigation, communication, agriculture, commerce, and industry. Israel will make every possible and necessary effort to lift the 60,000 destitute residents of the Gaza Strip from their current miserable condition and help ensure them proper living conditions and a reasonable standard of living... The Gaza Strip has been a critical point in terms of security, the ongoing economic crisis of its residents, and the refugee problem. An Israeli administration, with the assistance of the UN, will be able to resolve all three issues. Instead of continuing the nightmare that prevailed under Egyptian rule, the Gaza Strip can become a beacon for the entire region. For the first time in eight years, there is peace in the Strip and its surroundings, and mutual assistance exists between our southern villages and the Strip. For the first time in eight years, economic development projects are being carried out... The restoration of Egyptian influence—either directly through the return of the Egyptian army, or indirectly with the entry of UN marines, may block and cancel all constructive prospects, and the Strip will revert to chaos...".

In his speech, Ben-Gurion calls on the UN to cooperate with the Israeli interest for the benefit of all the peoples of the region, in order to prevent a new conflict in the Middle East and to ensure the establishment of genuine peace, out of the understanding that only Israeli control over the Gaza Strip would guarantee both peace and Israel’s ability to defend itself when necessary. 

Following the Sinai Campaign in 1956, the State of Israel found itself in a complex position: on the one hand, a clear military achievement—the capture of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip; and on the other hand, unprecedented international pressure, primarily from the United States and the Soviet Union, demanding immediate withdrawal from all the territories that had been captured. During the operation, Israel entered the Gaza Strip, an area that until then had been under Egyptian control and was inhabited almost entirely by a Palestinian population, many of whom were refugees. The Israeli military administration that entered Gaza encountered hostility, local uprisings, and at times even acts of terror by local forces. Despite Israeli attempts to stabilize the area, the atmosphere in Gaza remained tense, and Israeli control over the Strip was perceived as temporary, even by the government in Jerusalem.

Under pressure from the international community, and particularly in response to an American ultimatum that included threats of economic sanctions, Israel decided to withdraw from Gaza and Sinai in early 1957. The rationale behind agreeing to the withdrawal was the receipt of assurances—primarily from the United States and under UN auspices—that the maritime routes in the Gulf of Eilat would remain open, and that UN forces (UNEF) would be deployed in the Gaza Strip and Sinai to prevent a renewal of hostilities. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion did not hide his dissatisfaction with the outcome: he argued that the world was demanding that Israel pay a price for defending itself, while Arab acts of aggression were met with indifference. In this state of affairs, Ben-Gurion conveyed the Israeli message: either the world would uphold the rule of international law, or it would allow a descent into anarchy in which Israel would be forced to act alone—and the words seem as though they were written today.

14 pages. Very good condition.